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GIVING VIOLENCE A SPORTING CHANCE: A
REVIEW OF MEASURES USED TO CURB
EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Violence in professional sports has reached a point where participating
athletes have come to expect that their career will be short-lived because injuries,
caused by player violence, are so commonplace. All too often the media brings
news of an athlete who has been permanently injured because another player was
excessively violent. Broadcasts of professional sporting events, such as -football
or hockey, show players who intentionally throw other players to the ground
even after a play has been completed or spear other players with their hockey
sticks. These violent acts, although not necessary to the objective of winning in
the sport, are allowed to continue despite the injuries that they cause.
The fact is, sports violence has never been viewed as "real" violence. The courts,
except for isolated flurries of activity, have traditionally been reluctant to touch
even the most outrageous incidents of sports-related bloodletting; legal. experts
still flounder in their attempts to determine what constitutes violence in sport.
The great majority of violence-doers and their victims, the players, even though
rule-violating assaults often bring their careers to a premature close, have always
accepted much of what could be called violence as "part of the game." Large
segments of the public, despite the recent emergence of sports violence as a fullblown "social problem," continue to give standing ovations to performers for
acts that in other contexts would be instantly condemned as criminal.'
Although more and more people express concern about the violence that
occurs on the playing field,2 no successful solution to the problem has been
found. The federal legislature is aware of the problem, however, they have been
unable to agree on a means to prevent or reduce sports violence.' Alternatives
which could be used to reverse the current trend in society of accepting the
violent conduct by athletes on the playing field include, inter alia, self-regulation

1. Smith, What is Sports Violence?: A Sociolegal Perspective, in SPORTS VIOLENCE 33-4
(Goldstein ed. 1983).
2. Studies indicate that 60% of Americans believe that violence is a serious sport problem.
54% of the coaches, 74% of the sports journalists and 77% of the sports physicians surveyed also
saw violence as a serious problem. W.M. LEONARD II, A SOCIOLOoICA. PERSPECTIVE OF SPORT 169,
176 (3d ed. 1988).
3. On two occasions, bills were introduced by the House of Representatives that would require
professional sports leagues to establish an arbitration panel that would have the power to force clubs
and players to pay the costs of their excessively violent conduct. Those costs would include such
things as the medical expenses and lost wages of the injured player. H.R. 4495, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) and H.R. 2151, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For a more detailed discussion of this proposed
legislation, see infra footnotes 51-62 and accompanying text. Attempts were also made to enact
legislation which would criminalize excessively violent sports conduct. H.R. 7903, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980) and H.R. 2263, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). For a more detailed discussion of this
proposed legislation, see infra footnotes 42-50 and accompanying text.
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by professional athletic leagues, civil suits brought by the injured player, criminal
sanctions, or arbitration by a separate sports panel that specializes in player
violence. This note discusses these various measures and their likelihood of
success.
II. SELF-REGULATION

Responsibility for controlling player violence falls most frequently on the
league in which the athlete plays. Most professional sports leagues provide specific
procedures and sanctions to be used when violence occurs on the field.4 The
league defines what conduct should not be permitted, when a player has violated
league standards, and what sanctions should be imposed. Essentially, the league
acts as accuser, judge, and jury in its own private system of criminal law.Theoretically, several advantages could be realized by allowing a league to
regulate the conduct of its players. Judgment by a league administration can be
swift, certain, and severe. League officials are extremely familiar with the sport
and its customs. Therefore, they will be in the best position to determine if a
player's actions on the field exceed those generally accepted in the sport. Their
knowledge of the sport will allow the league officials to impose uniform and
predictable sanctions for violent acts. Thus, players will know what conduct is
frowned upon by the league and what form of punishment will ensue if they do
not follow league rules. 6 Since leagues have the power to suspend athletes from
play, the athletes may be less violent in order to prevent a loss of their livelihood.
Additionally, the length of time between the date that the violent conduct occurred
and the date that sanctions are imposed will be shorter than if the case were
heard by a federal or state court. Moreover, the courts' calendars will not be
clogged by large numbers of sports violence cases. Thus, internal regulation by
leagues would appear to offer many advantages in controlling violence.
The manner in which leagues are actually internally regulated, however,
differs substantially from the practices set forth previously.7 Violent conduct is
often tolerated by the league as part of the game. 8 As a result, league commissioners tend to punish excessive violence of athletes inconsistently and minimally. 9
4. For a general discussion of league regulatory procedures, see R. HoRxow, SPORTS VIOLENCE:
LAW 64-73 (1980).

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE LAWMAKING AND TBn CRIMNA

5. Extreme deference is given by federal and state courts to professional sports leagues' internal
fines and suspensions. Courts rarely intervene in a league's self-governance. Id. at 64.
6. Eitzen, Violence in Professional Sports and Public Policy, in GOVERNMENT AND SPORT:
PuBLIC POuCY IssuEs 102 (1985).
7. See supra footnote 6 and accompanying text.
8. "League officials and players accept the fact that some less talented players use violence to
compensate for inferior ability." Horrow, Violence in Professional Sports: Is It Part of the Game?,
9 J. LEGIS. 1 (1982).
9. Three examples from professional football illustrate this point:
(1) When George Atkinson leveled Lynn Swann with a vicious forearm, causing Swann
to suffer a serious concussion and miss part of the 1976 season, Commissioner Pete
Rozelle imposed a fine of $1,500 on Atkinson.
(2) When Darryl Stingley was paralyzed by Jack Tatum's vicious hit, which Tatum
admitted was overly aggressive in order to intimidate his opponent, not even his team
was penalized in yardage, since the blow was within the rules.
(3) When linebacker Stan Blinka was suspended for one game in 1982 by Rozelle for
a "cheap shot" against receiver John Jefferson, it marked only the second time in the
63-year history of the league (the first was in 1977) that a player had been suspended
by the league for an unnecessarily violent act.
Eitzen, supra note 6, at 103.
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In addition, a strong disincentive exists for league officials to punish violent
conduct. The media coverage of sporting events often focuses on violence that
is occurring on the field and rewards the players for engaging in that conduct. 0
Media portrayal of violence as acceptable or even necessary to sporting contests
instills in league managers the idea that without violence their sport will not be
as popular with the public. In order to keep fans happy, and so that ticket sales
and media coverage will continue, management feels it must encourage violence."
Thus, violence has a significant commercial value to sports leagues.
If leagues continue to believe violence is necessary in order to maintain or
increase revenues, they will not sanction excessive violence, but rather encourage
it. Sports violence will never diminish if the body responsible for regulating
misconduct believes that their profitability is dependent upon allowing violent
acts. The league officials' discretion in imposing sanctions will lean toward
permitting, rather than prohibiting, player violence. As a consequence, sports
leagues should not be permitted to regulate themselves since they perceive violence
as necessary to the sport and their continued success.
III.

CIVIL LIABILITY

Although the primary means of regulating violent conduct on the sporting
field lies with the professional sports leagues, injured players have sought redress
through federal and state courts.' 2 Courts have been called upon to determine
4
3
liability not only on the professional sports level,' but also on amateur,
collegiate, 5 and recreational 6 levels.
The trend in the courts, defining when a player will be held responsible for
the injuries he has caused, appears to be that a player must act with "reckless
10. "Media portrayal of violence in an attractive manner reinforces the assumption that violence
in sports is not criminal. The sports establishment and the media seem to believe that violence
enhances the marketability of professional sports." Horrow, supra note 8, at 3. For example, former
professional football player-coach John Madden now provides commentary for television coverage
of professional football, and annually he selects his "All-Madden" team which honors the season's
outstanding players and those who like to "get down and dirty" on the playing field.
Similarly, a most popular and commercially attractive videotape marketed by the official National
Football League film archives, annually compiles the season's top rated "hits," and also compares
them to an all time list of the most aggressive and visually dramatic tackles. The viewing public is
often invited to vote on the relative ranking of such lists. It must be stressed, however, that all the
tackles appearing on the videotapes are technically within the rules of football.
11. "Ifthey cut down on violence too much, people won't come out to watch. It's a reflection
of our society. People want to see violence and promoters appear to be all too willing to provide
fans with what they want. Violence sells!" W.M. LEONARD II, supra note 2, at 177 (quoting former
National Hockey League player Bobby Clarke).
12. Trial and appellate judges around the country are being called upon more frequently to
determine sports law issues. The key issue, with which the courts have struggled for two decades, is
the role of the legal system in the sports arena. Nowhere is this issue of judicial intervention more
keenly focused than when a player, injured during the course of an athletic contest by an opposing
player, seeks recovery in a tort action.
See Narol, Courts Define Standard of Care In Player vs. Player Litigation, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20,
1989, at 23.
13. Perhaps the most widely known professional case is Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,
435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931
(1979). See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
14. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 111. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
15. See Gavin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989).
16. See Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 210
(La. 1976).
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disregard.' 1 7 Reckless disregard is found when a player knows an act is harmful
and intends to commit the act, but does not intend by the act to harm an
opponent; further, it involves a player's knowledge of the danger and risk, which
knowledge is substantially greater than in the case of negligence.'"
The reckless disregard or reckless misconduct standard, as termed by the
courts, was applied to professional sports in Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals,

Inc. 19 In Hackbart, Dale Hackbart of the Denver Broncos was injured by Charles
Clark, a fullback for the Cincinnati Bengals. After a Broncos' interception,
Hackbart was kneeling in the Bengals' end zone watching the play upfield. Clark,
acting out of anger and frustration, but without a specific intent to injure, hit

Hackbart in the back of the neck with his forearm. The force from the blow
was strong enough to knock both players to the ground. Hackbart suffered

injuries from the blow which prevented him from playing effectively and eventually caused him to be relieved of his position as a professional football player. 20
The district court found that no duty existed between two professional
football players to refrain from reckless conduct during a game. 2' On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit defined reckless conduct" and then held that a professional
23
athlete does owe a duty to refrain from conduct which is reckless.
Since the courts will recognize that duties exist between professional athletes

to refrain from recklessly injuring one another, the remaining question is whether
civil liability is a likely method for deterring athletes from violent conduct. Several
reasons exist which would appear to make civil suits against athletes an appealing
deterrent.
First, by imposing civil liability upon a player, a court is actually going to
affect the financial resources of the player. Unlike fines imposed by the professional leagues, which are often paid by the player's team or of only minimal
dollar value, 24 a player may find damages imposed by the court to be substantially

17.

Reckless disregard falls somewhere between an intentional act and a negligent act.
§ 500 and comments (1961 & Supp. 1976-1986).

RESTATE-

(SECOND) OF TORTS
18. Id.

MENT

19. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979).
20. 435 F. Supp. at 353-4.
21. Id. at 358.
22. Reckless misconduct differs from negligence . . . in that negligence consists of mere
inadvertence, lack of skillfulness or failure to take precautions; reckless misconduct, on
the other hand, involves a choice or adoption of a course of action either with knowledge
of the danger or with knowledge of acts which would disclose this danger to a reasonable
man. Recklessness also differs in that it consists of intentionally doing an act with
knowledge not only that it contains a risk of harm to others as does negligence, but
that it actually involves a risk substantially greater in magnitude than is necessary in
the case of negligence .... [T]he difference, therefore, in the degree of risk .. .is that
the difference is so significant as to amount to a difference in kind.
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir. 1979).
23. Id. See cases cited supra notes 14-16 for application of the "reckless disregard" standard to
players in non-professional sporting contests.
For a discussion of the affirmative defenses which a player who is being sued may invoke, see
Comment, It's Not How You Play the Game, It's Whether You Win or Lose: The Need For Criminal
Sanctions To Curb Violence In Professional Sports, 12 HA.MEn, L. REv. 71, 77-9 (Winter 1988).

24.

See R. HoR.Row, supra note 4, at 75-6.
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higher.25 Players may think twice about committing such egregious acts when the
financial burden for doing so can be so high.
Second, a team may also be brought into the civil suit under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. 26 If a team fears that a jury may impose a substantial
damages verdict upon the team for the acts of its players, the team management
may exercise more careful control over its players in order to limit its liabilities.
When there are financial disincentives to a team and its players for allowing or
committing violent acts on the field, they may work to curb such socially
undesirable activities."
Although the civil suit appears to offer several advantages over league
regulation, it does have several problems. First, the injured player is required to
bring the suit, and an injured player is often reluctant to bring a suit against
another player. The player fears that he will be labelled as a troublemaker for
taking his claim outside of the league, or that his actions may result in an
2
informal "blacklisting" around the league.
Coinciding with the player's fear that he will be blacklisted for filing a claim
against another player, there is also a fear that court involvement will decrease
his chances of getting ahead in the sport. 29 Management can refuse to renew the
player's contract and other teams may be unwilling to sign a player who is
considered a troublemaker.
Other players can also play a role in preventing the injured player from
filing a lawsuit against another player. According to an unwritten macho code
which the players follow, courts are not the appropriate forum for resolving
player conflicts.30 A player who decides to go outside the league's own policing
mechanisms will soon find that he is considered an outcast by both league
management and players.
Second, the individual called upon to decide the case may not be familiar
with the nature of the sport. Unlike the case of internal regulation by the leagues,
a civil case will require that either a judge or jury decide the case. Decisions may
vary according to the composition of the jury and judicial discretion. Problems
develop as to what is and what is not considered acceptable violence. Without a
clear understanding of what violent conduct might occur during contact sports,
25. A player may be held liable for punitive damages, as well as compensatory damages. In
Tomianovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. H-78-243 (S.D. Tex., 1979), the jury returned a verdict
of $1.8 million in actual damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. The verdict was $600,000
more than the plaintiff requested.
26. The Circuit Court in Hackbart noted that not only can the player be sued, but also the
team for which he is playing. 601 F.2d at 524.
27. Eitzen, supra note 6, at 107.
28. Many owners adamantly deny that such a blacklist exists. There is evidence, however, to the
contrary. Bernie Parrish, a former defensive star with the Cleveland Browns of the National Football
League, suggests that he was blacklisted because of his activities in the National Football League
Player Association. Another former football player stated that blacklisting is used against a player
who ". . . refuses to accept rigid authority" or who has ". . . different values either morally or
otherwise than a coach." In short, the blacklist can be used against any player who the team
management (including the coach) feels is a "troublemaker" or whom the club feels is becoming too
political or a "clubhouse lawyer."
R. HoRaow, supra note 4, at 54-55 (citing B. PARRISH, THEY CALL IT A GAME, 172 (1974)).

29. R. HoRRow, supra note 4, at 50-51.
30. Horrow, supra note 8, at 5.
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a jury member will be unable to adequately assess whether that violent conduct
is excessive for the sport in question.
Third, the nature of professional sports requires that an athlete compete in
several different states. This creates a jurisdictional problem. States vary in their
laws. 3 A possibility exists that a different result may occur in each state, despite
the fact that the actual violent act, which is in question, is the same. If more
than one forum exists in which the court has jurisdiction over the case, an injured
player may forum shop for the court which is most likely to provide a favorable
outcome. This option does not exist for an aggrieved player who is required to
settle his dispute through internal league mechanisms.
Civil suits appear to offer a greater incentive to players and teams to reduce
violence on the field than does internal league regulation. By offering the
possibility that large damage verdicts may be awarded, a civil suit may put
players and management on their guard. In reality, however, the players rarely
go to court to recover for their injuries. Too many disincentives exist, such as
blacklisting, which prevent a player from seriously considering any alternative
mechanism for dispute resolution than those provided within the league. As a
means of deterring sports violence, therefore, civil suits do not appear to be a
mechanism which will work successfully until players rid themselves of the fear
that management or other players will seek revenge.
IV.

CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

A third method of deterring violent activities by professional athletes would
be to impose criminal liability. Criminal prosecution of sports violence is a means
which is rarely used and which is often difficult to apply successfully.3 2 In the
last ten years, the federal legislature has attempted to enact measures which
would impose criminal liability on athletes who use excessive violence on the
field.3 3 As yet, however, proponents of this legislation have been unable to rally
enough support in Congress to get the proposed bills passed.
A.

Attempts at Imposing Criminal Sanctions

On several occasions prosecutors have attempted to bring athletes up on
criminal assault charges. 34 Although the courts have heard these cases, successful
prosecution rarely occurs.
Perhaps the most famous case in the United States is State v. Forbes.31 On
January 4, 1975, the defendant, Forbes, was playing in a hockey game between
the Boston Bruins and the Minnesota North Stars. He was involved in an
altercation with an opposing player for which each player received time in the
penalty box. Upon returning to the ice, Forbes allegedly made a remark to the
opposing player and took a swing at him. Forbes missed hitting him with his
31. By allowing each state to apply its own rules, a different ruling may result. For example,
some jurisdictions apply the doctrine of respondeat superior narrowly, while others have a liberal
interpretation. Eitzen, supra note 6, at 108.
32. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 3.
34. See, e.g., Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (1970); Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d 164
(1970).
35. No. 63280, (Dist. Ct. Minn. dismissed Aug. 12, 1975).
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arm but did hit him with the end of his hockey stick. The player fell to the ice,
seriously injured, and Forbes jumped on him and punched him until the two
were separated.
Forbes was then prosecuted under the Minnesota criminal assault statute.
The question of Forbes's culpability was never resolved because the jury was
unable to reach a verdict.3 6 The prosecutor in the case decided not to retry the
case because he felt that, by taking the case to trial initially, he put the sports
world on notice that acts involving intent to cause serious bodily injury to another
7
would not be tolerated.
Although the Forbes case is the most well-known attempt in the United
States to apply criminal sanctions to a professional athlete, one case has been
decided in Canada that did result in a conviction of an American hockey player.3"
This case was the first successful criminal prosecution for violence in professional
sports.3 9

As is evidenced by the fact that the first imposition of criminal sanctions
did not occur until August 1988, successful use of the criminal courts to deter
violence on the sports field is highly unlikely. Although criminal sanctions have
the potential for diminishing excessive violence on the athletic field, in reality
they have not been a useful method of deterrence.
Two explanations can be given for the lack of successful prosecutions. First,
"intent," which is often a necessary element to proving criminal assault cases,
is extremely difficult to prove in sports violence cases.4 Guilty verdicts will only
be awarded in extremely violent incidents and in jurisdictions where intent must
specifically be alleged. In those jurisdictions, successful prosecution of sports
violence cases will be the exception, not the rule.
Second, prosecutors are often unaware of or indifferent to sports violence
incidents .4 Unless cases come to the attention of the prosecutor, he will be
unable to prosecute the assaulting player. Additionally, prosecutors are often
36. R. HoR.ow, supra note 4, at 163.
37. Id. (citing Flackne and Caplan, Sports Violence and the Prosecution, 12 TRIAL 33 (1977)).
Criminal prosecution for sports violence is not only difficult in the United States, but also in Canada.
See Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (1970) (player reacting instinctively by hitting another player
over the head after he has been speared and who does so in protection of his own safety should not
be found guilty of common assault); Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (1970) (resulting in an
acquittal).
38. On August 24, 1988, Dino Ciccarelli, of the Minnesota North Stars hockey team, was
convicted of assaulting an opposing player and was sentenced to a day in jail and a fine of $1,000.
The incident occurred during a hockey game between the North Stars and the Toronto Maple Leafs.
Ciccarelli attacked a player on the opposing team by hitting him over the head twice with his hockey
stick and then punching him in the face. Comment, supra note 23, at 80.
39. Id.
40. Three explanations have been given as to why intent is so difficult to prove:
(1) objective indications used to evaluate the mental state of the participant are often
limited;
(2) the court may embrace the view that an athlete participates in competition out of
love for the game, not out of a malicious desire to harm the opponent; therefore, the
r quisite mens rea does not exist; and
(3) physical intimidation is often seen as "just part of the football or hockey game;"
therefore, prosecutors would have difficulty proving that an athlete specifically intended
to harm an opponent.
R. HotRow, supra note 4, at 130-135.
41. See generally R. Hos.Row, supra note 4, at 130-135.
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unwilling to add sports violence cases to their already crowded schedules, except

in instances where the assault was extremely severe.4 2 An athlete will not be
deterred from violent conduct by the threat of criminal sanctions if he believes
that only in rare and extreme instances will a prosecutor actually bring a case to
court.

In summary, if prosecutors rarely bring sports violence cases to court and
in those cases intent is difficult to prove, the likelihood of successful criminal
prosecution is minimal. A player who believes that imposition of criminal
sanctions will rarely occur will not be deterred from violent conduct by the
minimal threat that this result may be obtained.
B.

Sports Violence Act 3 - A Legislative Proposal to Criminalize Excessive
Sports Violence

In 1981, the House of Representatives reintroduced a bill from the previous
Congress which would make excessive sports violence in professional sports a
federal crime. 4" The bill was intended to draw a line between acceptable, although
aggressive, behavior and excessively violent conduct and to criminalize behavior
which crosses that line. 41 Additionally, the bill's sponsors hoped that several
benefits could be achieved from the enactment of a law which imposes criminal
sanctions for sports violence, namely:
First, the threat of criminal prosecution would deter most extreme acts and
make each game safer for all participants.
Second, a player who stays on the safe side of the line need never worry
about prosecution.
Third, legislation will symbolically confirm that
fundamental law and order do not stop at the ticket gate.
42. In Richard B. Horrow's extensive study of sports violence, he surveyed prosecutors across
the country to elicit information on how the prosecutors decide to prosecute a case. Some of the
responses to these surveys included the following answers:
(i) "Prosecution must only be warranted in those cases of sports violence where assault
is so intentioned, so gross, and so disregarding of human welfare as to shock the
conscience of society." Maricopa County (Phoenix) Attorney Charles F. Hyder.
(ii) "Only the excessively bad case . . . and/or cases that arise as a result of sports,
but off the field" would be prosecuted. Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) District Attorney
Robert E. Colville.
Id. at 131-32.
43. H.R. 7903, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (reintroduced as H.R. 2263, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981)).
44. The bill provided in relevant part that:
"[a] player in a professional sports event who knowingly uses excessive physical force
and thereby causes a risk of significant bodily injury to another person involved in that
event shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both."
H.R. 2263 § 115(a), 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
The bill defined "excessive physical force" as force that:
"(A) has no reasonable relationship to the competitive goals of the sport;
(B) is unreasonably violent; and
(C) could not be reasonably foreseen, or was not consented to, by the injured person,
as a normal hazard of such person's involvement in such sports event."
Id.
45. Excessive Violence in Professional Sports: Hearings on H.R. 7903 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Ronald M. Mottl).
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Last, incidents of excessive during-the-game violence must be punished when
countless young people look to professional sports figures as role models for
their own behavior on and off the field."6
The proposed legislation met with extreme opposition by professional sports
league representatives, 47 however, and never made it out of the House of Representatives.
Although the intent of the proposed Sports Violence Act"-to more clearly
define what was considered to be excessive violence in sports and to attempt to
deter that conduct-was commendable, the actual drafting of the Act was
troublesome. The language of the bill was so ambiguous and general that applying
the bill to actual violent conduct would result in uncertain and arbitrary results. 49
Excessive physical force, as defined by the bill, required that the violent conduct
bear "no reasonable relationship to the competitive goals of the sport." 0 No
guidance was provided, however, as to what would be considered a "reasonable
relationship" or "competitive goals." Thus, the courts would have had to decide
when these conditions were met, despite being unfamiliar with the nature of the
sport. Courts, without intending to do so, would therefore provide arbitrary
meanings to these terms and create conditions for uncertain outcomes in criminal
violence cases.
There was another problem, unrelated to the drafting of the bill, which
would have limited the feasibility of the proposed legislation. Prosecutors are
often unaware of or inattentive to incidents of sports violence." If a prosecutor
is unwilling to bring an athlete up on criminal charges, the actual language of
the criminal statute which would be applied is irrelevant since it will never be
put to use.
V.

SPORTS VIOLENCE ARBITRATION ACT: AN ARBITRATION
PANEL TO DETER VIOLENCE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

Perhaps the most intriguing method offered to curb violence in professional
sports was the Sports Violence Arbitration Act. 5 2 Members of the House of
Representatives, on three separate occasions, attempted to pass legislation which
would require professional sports leagues to establish an arbitration panel that
would create financial incentives for clubs and players to refrain from encouraging
or engaging in unnecessarily violent conduct.5 3 Unfortunately, the bill's sponsors
46. Id.

47. League representatives indicated that they felt their internal league mechanisms to prevent
violence were sufficient and that the bill, as drafted, provided insufficient guidance as to when
"excessive force" exists. See, e.g., statement by John A. Ziegler, Jr., President of the National
Hockey League, id. at 138-40; statement by Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, National Football League,
id. at 173-75; and statement by Philip A. Woosnam, Commissioner, North American Soccer League,
id. at 212-13.
48. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
49. "In application to particular episodes, the bill's language would create as many uncertainties
as may currently exist under state law." Supra ncte 45 (statement by Pete Rozelle, Commissioner,
National Football League), at 174.
50. See supra note 41.
51. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
52. H.R. 5079, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981) (reintroduced as H.R. 4495, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), and H.R. 2151, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)).
53. R. Hoa~ow, supra note 4, at 14.
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were unable to gain enough support in Congress to enact any of the bills into
law.
The arbitration panel, as originally proposed,54 was composed of a neutral
panel of sports experts whose function was to resolve injury-grievance disputes
evolving from violent conduct. 5 The arbitration panel would determine on a
case-by-case basis whether the incident constituted conduct that was punishable
and, if so, impose sanctions that would hold both the assaulting player and his
club financially responsible for excessively violent conduct.56 The decision of the
arbitration panel would be binding upon the parties and not subject to appeal .
The arbitration panel, as proposed in the Act, included several of the most
successful attributes of other measures for deterring violence which have been
discussed in this note. The arbitration panel was to be neutral,58 a quality found
in federal and state courts which hear sports grievances. The members of the
panel were to be experts in the sport for which they would decide cases, 59 similar
to those individuals charged with imposing sanctions when a sports league is selfregulated. The sanctions imposed could be as severe and substantial as jury
determinations in civil cases. The club, as well as the player, could be penalized
for the player's violent conduct, 60 similar to a civil court's application of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Case loads would not be overwhelming for the
panel, a quality found when a professional league regulates itself. Each of these
attributes would contribute to a system of deterrence that is swift, certain, and
severe.
Notwithstanding the fact that the sports arbitration panel alternative does
appear to combine the most successful attributes of the various methods for
deterring sports violence, it has one major flaw. Grievances are brought before
the panel by an injured player and his club. 6' As discussed earlier, leagues prefer
to be self-regulated and will ostracize players who attempt to resolve grievances
outside of the league's internal system.6 Although the arbitration panel is
established by the professional league, it would act independently of the league. 6
Club management, which is concerned that eliminating violence will reduce their

54. The original idea for the arbitration panel was developed in a law review note by two
students from the University of Southern California. The note was published by Chris J. Carlsen

and Matthew Shane Walker as The Sports Court: A Private System to Deter Violence in Professional

Sports, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1982).
55.

Id. at 414-15.

56.

131 CoNa. REc. E5285-01 (daily ed. November 20, 1985) (statement of Rep. Daschle).
The player could be subject to substantial fines and suffer suspension without pay.
Moreover, the club could be required to pay the salary and medical expenses of the
injured player as well as compensatory damages if the player could not perform in the
future. The club could also be required to relinquish a draft choice or pay damages to
compensate the injured player's club for the loss of the player's services. Additionally,
fines might be imposed on the club for failing to supervise its players properly.

57.
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58.
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See generally Note, supra note 54, at 427-28.
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61. Id.
62. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
63. See Note, supra note 54, at 427.
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profitability," may avoid bringing cases before a neutral panel which does not
have similar concerns. They may also exert pressure on players to prevent them
from filing claims with the panel. Therefore, the arbitration panel will not aid
in deterring violence in professional sports if injured players and management
do not bring their complaints before it.
Although the arbitration panel proposed in the Sports Violence Act has
many attributes which could have a positive impact on reducing sports violence,
it is not the perfect solution. First, Congress must enact the proposed legislation,
which requires a significant amount of support from individuals who believe
sports are too violent. Second, until professional athletes and management accept
the arbitration panel as a meaningful method of resolving injury disputes, the
panel will sit idle, and violence on the field will continue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Society has come to realize that, although certain levels of violence are to
be expected in professional sports, something must be done which will curb an
athlete's urge to engage in excessive violence. Several methods of deterring violence
have been explored in this note, but none of them provide a perfect solution.
The arbitration panel, which has been proposed by the House of Representatives, provides the most likely means for successfully curbing excessive violence.
The panel responsible for determining what conduct is beyond the scope of
accepted violence will be familiar with the customs and rules of the sport. The
panel will not be overloaded with cases, a problem which does exist in federal
and state courts. The panel, which is free of management influence, will not be
concerned about the possibility of decreasing revenues by decreasing violence.
Despite the fact that many of the problems inherent in other forms of
regulating sports violence are eliminated by the arbitration panel, it possesses one
major drawback. Players, teams or sports officials are required to bring their
grievances before the panel. A fear of league reprisal, such as that which occurs
when a player brings a civil suit against another player or team, may thus hinder
the success of the arbitration panel.
One means of overcoming this problem would be to appoint an individual(s),
who is knowledgeable about the sport in question and is also free of both
management and player influence, to act in a capacity similar to a criminal
prosecutor. This person-a sports ombudsman-would bring cases of player
misconduct before the arbitration panel for resolution.
Although many sports fans, teams and players do not consider player violence
to be a serious problem, a large number of career or life-ending injuries caused
by sports violence exist. The leagues are unwilling to risk revenue dollars by
policing violence. The injured players, who fear league reprisal, will not take
their claims to court. The federal and state courts cannot guarantee uniform
guidelines for defining what is excessive violence. Therefore, the federal and state
legislatures are the bodies who are most capable of implementing a system, such
as the modified arbitration panel discussed above, which will successfully deter
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See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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athletes from engaging in excessive violence on the playing field. Those bodies
should recognize the need for regulation of the sporting industry and adopt
measures which will penalize players and teams who engage in excessively violent
conduct.
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